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Working Paper – June 11, 2012 
This paper investigates preferences for different health profiles, especially sequences of increasing 
and decreasing pain. We test conflicting predictions in terms of preferences over two painful 
sequences. The QALY concept relevant for the determination of different levels of health-related 
quality of life implies indifference, whereas behavioral theories find preferences related to ordering, 
following the peak-end-rule. Using an experimental design with real consequences we generate 
decisions about painful sequences induced by the cold pressor test. The results are compared with 
hypothetical choice data elicited using standard methods. We find that hypothetical methods reveal 
decisions in line with the peak-end-rule. However when it comes to real consequences of their 
decisions, subjects are on average not willing to pay for that preference. 
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1. Introduction 
People rarely experience their health state to be constant over time. In most cases, the perceived 
state of health varies temporally, which is especially the case when patients undergo medical 
treatments. The paper investigates perception of pain and addresses the question on whether 
people have systematic preferences for treatments in which pain varies. Specifically, we analyze 
whether experimental subjects have systematic preferences for either gradually increasing or 
decreasing pain intensities. Because economic and behavioral literature leads to different 
conclusions about peoples´ preferences, we compare both strands of literature with experimental 
methods including real consequences. Additionally, we try to identify whether people in addition of 
stating a preference for one option or the other, are also willing to pay for receiving that preferred 
option over the alternative. We find that in contrast to behavioral studies on pain, people do not 
demonstrate a preference for one option when facing real consequences of their choices. 
Our results are particularly important as they clarify fundamental decision situations people are 
confronted with when they suffer from pain. This situation can involve both the patient when 
choosing a treatment or medical staff when decisions concerning a treatment are taken 
substitutionally for the patient (Ariely 1998; Choinière u.a. 1990). As the number of pain patients is 
constantly rising (Breivik u.a. 2006; Dagenais, Caro & Haldeman 2008; Phillips & Harper 2011), 
preference-related questions are highly relevant. Our findings shed light on the preference structure 
for sequences with increasing or decreasing pain levels using real pain. This means that participants 
make a preference decision on painful sequences and afterwards the corresponding pain sequence 
is induced with the cold pressor test (CPT) (Hines & Brown 1936). By means of this decision making 
situation associated with real consequences, we aim to enlarge the general understanding of 
preferences pain patients have. Beyond that, we clarify experimentally whether either behavioral or 
economic literature adequately describes decision-making on painful sequences and whether real 
choice data confirm empirical findings from hypothetical choice scenarios. 
Following economic theory, decision makers have consistent and stable underlying preferences. 
Furthermore, Rational Choice Theory includes the assumption of additive separability (Samuelson 
1937) which states that the value of a sequence of outcomes equals the value of its component 
parts (Kahneman, Wakker & Sarin 1997). An application of economic theory for the context of 
health-related decision-making is the QALY concept (Weinstein & Stason 1977). The QALY is an index 
that describes a preference order of different health states and courses of a disease. The index is 
calculated using two factors: quality of life and time. Quality of life is defined by a factor between 0 
(death) and 1 (perfect health) reflecting the current health state and is multiplied with the remaining 
life expectancy. Hence the index consists of the factor quality of life including all restrictions like 
disability or pain and the factor time but it disregards whether over the duration of an illness health 
improves or deteriorates. Instead, the QALY concept assumes neutrality towards the timing of 
different health states (Dolan 2008). According to the QALY concept and Rational Choice Theory, 
people must be indifferent when confronted with a choice scenario including two experiences which 
differ only in the arrangement of its inherent parts.  
The assumption that sequence order is of no relevance has been criticized repeatedly (Loewenstein 
& Prelec 1993) and various studies demonstrate deviations from additive separability. The relevance 
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of order within sequences is not investigated only in the domain of health economics. The 
psychological literature presents a variety of studies that investigate deviations from the theory. One 
strand of literature focuses on the overall order of elements within a sequence, especially whether 
the trend is improving or declining. Concerning wages for example, workers have strong preferences 
for an increasing development (Loewenstein & Sicherman 1991). In terms of aversive outcomes, 
Varey and Kahneman (1992) find a preference for improving sequences. 
Apart from the order of elements, another strand of literature points out the relevance of the 
specific position of an item within a sequence. For example, the recency-effect describes the 
dominance of the last item in a sequence in determining individuals´ preference order (Miller 
& Campbell 1959; Eysenck & Keane 2010). Besides the final element, the item in a sequence of 
strongest intensity, the peak, outstandingly influences overall evaluation of a sequence. This 
phenomenon is called the peak-end-effect (Kahneman u.a. 1993). Preferences according to these 
decision rules are obtained for various circumstances, such as pain (Redelmeier & Kahneman 1996; 
Redelmeier, Katz & Kahneman 2003), learning experience (Finn 2010), pleasurable goods (Do, Rupert 
& Wolford 2008), and overall long-term evaluation of life (Diener, Wirtz & Oishi 2001).  
Models of rational choice, such as the QALY, are frequently violated in empirical studies on decision-
making. However such findings base on hypothetical choice scenarios. Results from hypothetical 
questionnaires are generally valid (Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck & Perner 2002) but decisions 
involving real consequences often differ from hypothetical settings. Holt and Laury (2002) show that 
risk aversion increases when lottery choices are real compared with hypothetical choices. 
Furthermore, in risk-free settings Voelckner (2006) focused on buying behavior and reports that 
subjects pay less for products in a real buying scenario compared to their hypothetically stated 
willingness to pay (WTP). That means, a lack of real consequences in such choice situations can lead 
to a hypothetical bias (Murphy u.a. 2005; Harrison & Rutström 2008), which causes deviations from 
rational predictions in hypothetical choice scenarios. In general, people tend to make decisions more 
in line with rational choice models once real consequences are introduced (Camerer & Hogarth 
1999; Hertwig & Ortmann 2001).  
For health-related decision-making, there are only few studies available that analyze differences in 
decision making in hypothetical and real choice scenarios (Christensen-Szalanski 1984; Read 
& Loewenstein 1999; Blumenschein u.a. 2001; Pesheva, Kroll & Vogt 2011). Blumenschein et al. 
(2001) demonstrate empirically that asthma patients´ WTP for an asthma management program is 
lower if participants really have to pay for it instead of stating their hypothetical WTP. Experiments 
on decisions involving pain applying the cold pressor test (CPT) (Hines & Brown 1936) find that 
participants´ WTP to avoid pain is higher in hypothetical scenarios than when facing real 
consequences (Pesheva, Kroll & Vogt 2011). In addition, Read (1999) shows that subjects who read a 
description of a painful scenario have a higher willingness to accept pain in exchange for money than 
people who really experienced the described pain before stating their decisions. Because of these 
findings demonstrating differences in real and hypothetical health-related settings, we elicit 
subjects´ preferences for a scenario involving improving and declining sequences of pain including 
real consequences.  
To investigate whether participants´ choices represent distinct perceived differences between both 
sequences or whether both are comparatively similar to them, we include different amounts of real 
 
 
5 
 
WTP. Thus the preferred option is available only if subjects pay for it. Inconsiderate answers can 
occur if evaluations of both sequences rarely differ or if they are equal. In this case, secondary 
mechanisms or the avoidance of cognitive effort of finding very small differences might cause a 
decision for one alternative which does not reflect the actual preference (Kühberger, Schulte-
Mecklenbeck & Perner 2002). People tend to reduce effort when the decision task is complex and 
requires high mental effort (Wilcox 1993). This is often the case when subjects do not have a lot of 
experience in performing the task at hand. In cases where differences between consequences do not 
provide adequate incentives to reveal the true preference, secondary motives may lead to a choice 
that does not reflect the true preference. 
As a standard method from psychology and medical practice to elicit preferences, we implement a 
numerical rating scale (NRS) (Amelang & Zielinski 2002) which is commonly applied and considered 
to be reliable and valid in clinical research (Dworkin u.a. 2005). However such studies on reliability 
and validity for rating scales all base on questioning subjects whose answers never include any 
consequence (Jensen 2003). Economists commonly use WTP to investigate preference intensities 
reflected by the amounts of money subjects pay. For various goods participants choose one of two 
alternatives and additionally state how much they are willing to pay (Loewenstein & Prelec 1991; 
Varey & Kahneman 1992) to receive the desired option over the alternative. To implement real 
consequences from decisions, participants in our experiment choose one option (a sequence of 
painful stimuli) which they receive at the end of the experiment. Consequences regarding the 
preference of painful sequences are realized using the CPT (Hines & Brown 1936), which is a 
standard method used in pain research (Lovallo 1975; Lee, Watson & Frey Law 2010; Streff u.a. 
2010).  
By combining the two standard methods, numerical rating scale and WTP, with the controlled 
induction of different pain levels, we can analyze whether the empirical violations of Rational Choice 
Theory are robust to the implementation of real consequences. Additionally the analysis of WTP 
allows us to judge whether participants are actually willing to pay to receive either the improving or 
declining sequence of pain levels.  
We find that participants state preferences for one of the options. According to that preference, the 
unfavored option is rated more painful on the NRS with a median difference of two points. Previous 
work in clinical research considers this difference to be significant (Farrar u.a. 2001). However the 
median WTP to receive the preferred sequence is 0.  
That means while elicited preferences using NRS or simple choice between the options are 
significantly in favor of the improving sequence, people are not willing to pay for receiving that 
sequence over the other. Therefore, these preferences are considered to be secondary. Once real 
consequences are introduced, we find that participants are indifferent between the two options, 
which is in line with rational predictions. 
2. Experiment 
2.2 Experimental task 
At the beginning of each session the participants received written instructions about the general 
setup of the experiment. After they read the instructions, the experimenter started the test phase of 
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the experiment, where participants experience two sequences of painful stimuli realized with the 
CPT (Hines & Brown 1936). Each sequence was realized in separate water bowls, with each sequence 
consisting of three water bowls with temperatures of 4°C, 8°C, and 12°C. One sequence provided 
rising temperatures (4-8-12) and the other falling temperatures (12-8-4). The sequence starting with 
4° Celsius represents the one a decider would prefer based on the peak-end-rule, because peak (4°) 
and end (12°) diverge which means that the last part is positive. This is different for the declining 
sequence where both, the worst moment and the last moment coincide which makes it even more 
unattractive. Each sequence was experienced with one hand; the second sequence always included 
a change of the hand. Within a sequence a change to the next bowl must be done without any break 
whereas between the test of the two sequences there was a short break of about 30 seconds for the 
participants before the continuation with the other hand. Whether participants tested the improving 
or declining sequence first was determined randomly. During the test phase, participants were 
neither informed about the temperatures of the water in any bowl nor about the immersion 
durations of one minute per bowl.  
In the decision phase, subjects received written instructions about the payoff mechanism for the 
experiment. They were informed that they would perform a series of decisions but only one of them 
would be realized at the end of the session. The decision process is outlined in figure 1 and explained 
subsequently. 
Figure 1: Overview of the experimental procedure 
 
The first decision (table 1) requires participants to determine whether they prefer to repeat the first 
or second experience or whether they are indifferent between the two, provided that they had to 
repeat one of the sequences (figure 1, box 1).  
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No. A B A B indifferent 
1 Repetition of the first 
experience 
Repetition of the second 
experience 
   
Table 1: The first decision 
The second decision sheet consisted of 25 choices. Since we set out to test whether subjects are 
willing to pay for receiving their preferred option, the composition of the second decision sheet 
depended on the first decision (tables 2a and 2b).  
No. Alternative A Alternative B A B indifferent 
2 2. Experience 1. Experience plus payment of 0.20 Euro    
3 2. Experience 1. Experience plus payment of 0.40 Euro    
…  
26 3. Experience 1. Experience plus payment of 5.00 Euro    
Table 2a: WTP answer sheet for participants who prefer sequence 1  
No. Alternative A Alternative B A B indifferent 
2 1. Experience 2. Experience plus payment of 0.20 Euro    
3 1. Experience 2. Experience plus payment of 0.40 Euro    
…  
26 1. Experience 2. Experience plus payment of 5.00 Euro    
Table 2b: WTP answer sheet for participants who prefer sequence 2  
Each participant was asked to perform choices between their less desired option of the two and 
their preferred option. The less desired option was always free of charge, while subjects had to pay 
specified amounts of money for receiving their preferred option (cp. figure 1, boxes 2a and 2b). The 
charge for the latter varied between the 25 choice scenarios systematically between 0.20 Euro and 5 
Euro in increments of 20 cent. 
For those subjects who choose the unfavored sequence for decisions 2 through 26, indicating no 
willingness to pay for their favored option of decision 1, there was an additional answer sheet. Since 
this decision pattern can indicate that subjects did not state their real preference in decision 1, we 
use this to control whether subjects have positive WTP for receiving one of the options. The answer 
sheet was the same as before, but the varying amounts of payment were added for receiving the 
sequence subjects did not choose in decision 1 (figure 1, box 3a and b). Indeed, none of the subjects 
indicated WTP on the control answer sheet which is consistent with their choices indicated in the 
first decision. 
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At the end of the decision phase, we asked participants to rate pain intensities for the two 
sequences they experienced in the test phase on eleven point numerical rating scales (NRS). Low 
numbers reflect low pain intensity and high numbers reflect high pain intensity. This approach is the 
standard for pain measurement in clinical studies (Jensen 2003). Participants who had been 
indifferent between both sequences in the first decision (figure 1, box 1) immediately continued 
with the NRS omitting the WTP questions. 
Finally, as it was described to the subjects at the beginning of their session, we used an urn with 
numbered balls (one for each decision the subject performed) to determine randomly which of the 
decisions was going to be realized. This procedure was repeated for each subject individually. The 
number on the ball reflected the decision that was realized. For that randomly selected decision, the 
subject received the sequence of pain stimuli they preferred, and where applicable paid the 
specified amount to the experimenter. Every participant realized their received sequence of pain 
stimuli as previously done during the test phase. After the participant finalized this realization stage, 
the experimental session was concluded.  
3.2 Experimental procedure 
The group of participants consisted of 80 students (41 females) from the Otto-von-Guericke 
University Magdeburg from different fields of study recruited using ORSEE {Greiner 2004}. Students 
were not informed in the invitation that it was an experiment on pain and had no prior experience 
with CPT type experiments.  
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the Department for Sensor Technology at the 
Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg in sessions with one participant at a time. The laboratory 
provides the equipment to administer the CPT using six circulating coolers2. These machines include 
a water bowl for which the water temperature can be regulated by a thermostat. Additionally a 
pump guarantees that within the bowl the temperature is the same everywhere, on the surface as 
well as on the ground or in the area close to the immersed hand.  
One week before participating in the experiment, subjects came to our office to receive a show-up 
fee of 12 Euro. The show-up fee was paid in advance of the actual experimental session to reduce 
the influence of the house money effect (Thaler & Johnson 1990) and create a choice scenario where 
subjects behave as if they were using their own out-of-pocket money (Müller, Kroll & Vogt 2011). 
With accepting the show-up-fee, subjects agreed to show up for their experimental session and 
agreed to pay back the 12 Euro to the experimenter if they did not. All participants who received the 
show-up fee of 12 Euro did show up for their assigned session. 
At the beginning of every session, each subject was informed that the experiment involves pain 
induced by cold water. Subsequently, the circulating coolers were presented and explained. 
Participants were informed that the experiment excludes any risk for health and safety. After being 
fully informed about the CPT-procedure and having time to ask the experimenter any further 
questions they may have, each participant was asked to sign a consent form before the actual choice 
experiment started. All subjects agreed to sign the consent form and proceeded to the experiment. 
                                      
2 We used a Julabo F12-ED Refrigerated/Heating Circulator; Detailed technical information about the system 
can be found here: http://www.julabo.de/us/p_datasheet.asp?Produkt=F12-ED 
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4. Results 
In the NRS task, where subjects rate their displeasure for both pain sequences, subjects provide a 
mean rating of 4.66 for the sequence with declining pain levels, while they report 5.99 for the 
declining sequence (cp. Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1: Ratings for both sequences on the NRS 
 
The median difference in the ratings of both sequences is two points indicating a preference for the 
sequence with an improving trend. According to Farrer et al. (2001) this is clinically important. The 
same preference relation can be elicited for the first decision which includes real consequences: 57 
out of 80 subjects choose the improving sequence. Therefore, the preference elicited using the 
standard measure deployed in clinical studies and the experimental task applied in this study is in 
favor of the sequence with decreasing pain intensities. This result is in line with the previous studies 
on pain related decision making that use hypothetical settings (Varey & Kahneman 1992) and 
consistent with peak and end evaluation (Diener, Wirtz & Oishi 2001; Do, Rupert & Wolford 2008).  
The remaining decisions allow us to analyze whether subjects are willing to pay for receiving the 
improving sequence. We elicit the maximum willingness to pay for receiving the preferred option for 
each participant individually (cp. figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Amounts subjects were willing to pay for the two sequences. None of the subjects 
indicated a maximum WTP between 3.20 and 4.80 Euro, thus we leave these values out in the table. 
We calculate for each participant the maximum willingness to pay for the improving sequence. Note 
that we code a preference for the declining sequence with a negative willingness to pay. Although 76 
participants state preferences for one of the sequences (four subjects are indifferent in the first 
decision), only 44 of them are also willing to pay to receive their preferred option, whereas 36 
subjects do not state WTP for either sequence. Hence, the median willingness to pay for the 
improving sequence is not significantly different from zero (Binomial-Test, 1%-level), which means 
that subjects are not willing to pay for any of the two preferences.  
At the next step we control for sequence effects. This means that the order in which both sequences 
are experienced can have an influence on the later evaluation. For the experimental procedure, the 
sample was randomly divided into one group who first experiences the increasing sequence 
(“increasing first”) and another group starting with the declining sequence (“declining first”) (cp. 
Table 3, column 1 and 2). We focus on the WTP of these two groups. The distribution of preferences 
for the increasing and declining sequence strongly varies between them. In group “increasing first” 
36 out of 37 subjects prefer the increasing sequence (a preference in line with the peak-end-effect), 
in group “declining first” 21 out of 43 participants favor the increasing sequences, 18 state 
preferences for the declining one (4 are indifferent). This strongly differing distribution between the 
two groups “increasing first” and “declining first” is noticeable because the only difference between 
the groups is the order in which the sequences were experienced at the beginning. However, this 
order is of no relevance for the level of pain intensity, particularly because the hand was changed for 
the second sequence. This means that preferences do not result from the peak-end-effect alone but 
also a primacy effect is evident. This effect states that subjects prefer the first element within a row 
because it can enter memory more easily as no other elements interfere so far (Murdock 1962). In 
case of the primacy-effect, the row consists of two elements, namely the two sequences. To better 
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understand the individual influence of the peak-end-effect and the primacy-effect we focus on the 
four quadrants in table 3 in more detail. At first sight, the first column is more striking because of the 
strong disequilibrium of preferences. The 36 subjects have experienced the increasing sequence first 
and also favor it. However here we cannot elicit if subjects state preferences in line with peak-end- 
or primacy-effect. Therefore, we focus on the second column: we can interpret that 21 subjects 
answer according to peak-end-predictions, whereas the 18 other participants realized predictions 
from the primacy-effect. Thus we find that there are two different categories of subjects. At the next 
step we investigate whether their WTP differs in relation to their category. Therefore, we only 
compare the two groups of the second column: declining sequence experienced first; preferences 
either in line with peak-end or primacy. We find that WTP in both groups significantly differs (Mann-
Whitney-U-test, 1% level), which confirms our assumption of two categories of subjects, the peak-
end-decider and the primacy-decider. 
            experienced first 
preferred 
Improving 
4° - 8° - 12° 
Declining 
12° - 8° - 4° 
Improving 
4° - 8° - 12° 
36 
Mean WTP: 1.15 Euro 
21 
Mean WTP: 0.75 
Declining 
12° - 8° - 4° 
1 
WTP: 0 Euro 
18 
Mean WTP: 0.47 
Table 3: Distribution of preferences depending on the sequence which was experienced first  
However, the discrimination of subjects as decider either in line with the primacy-effect or the peak-
end-effect is not relevant for the general finding that subjects significantly report preferences for 
sequences differing in trend of pain intensity. They are not willing to pay for receiving their preferred 
option in the case that it requires costs. Thus for the elicitation of people´s preferences, the inclusion 
of real consequences is relevant for an adequate comparability of experimental with real decision 
situations. 
5. Conclusion 
The study presented in this paper focuses on the elicitation of preferences for painful sequences 
that either rise or drop in pain intensity. Employing a setup that combines previous approaches used 
in the literature with an experimental design where subjects face real consequences from their 
choices, we analyze whether subjects have a systematic preference for a specific sequence of painful 
stimuli, when pain intensities and time of exposure remain constant.  
While previous studies report a preference for improving sequences (Loewenstein & Prelec 1991; 
Varey & Kahneman 1992), economic models of rational choice do not account for such preferences 
(Camerer & Hogarth 1999; Hertwig & Ortmann 2001). We find that when decision makers do not 
have to pay for their preferred option, they report preferences that are in line with behavioral 
literature even when facing real consequences from their choices. However, when adding costs to 
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the preferred option our study shows that subjects are not willing to pay significant amounts for the 
improving sequence. 
One of the frequently applied economic models that is criticized based on the findings of peak-end 
phenomena is the QALY concept. Although findings concerning trend and order preferences within a 
sequence of experiences are valid (Redelmeier & Kahneman 1996; Redelmeier, Katz & Kahneman 
2003; Finn 2010; Do, Rupert & Wolford 2008; Diener, Wirtz & Oishi 2001) and thus question the 
construction of a quality index, our findings confirm the adequacy of this construction when 
assessing economic efficiency of health related policies. Since subjects do not reveal willingness to 
pay for their elicited preference, prioritizing treatments based on these findings does not create 
welfare in an economic sense. Therefore, the QALY concept is applicable for economic analyses of 
health related policies. 
To summarize our findings, the inclusion of real consequences in our experiment relativized the 
criticism of behavioral studies in terms of the appropriateness of Rational Choice Theory to describe 
subjects´ decision making behavior. Validations of findings from hypothetical studies are crucial 
especially in health-related contexts because their results can cause adjustments of important 
concepts like the QALY and far-reaching decisions underlie such findings. Though our results show 
that the assumptions of the QALY concept concerning the rationality people demonstrate in decision 
making situations are correct. Accordingly the QALY concept does not lack validity but adequately 
respects the preferences of affected people. 
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